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BOOK REVIEWS
Daniel Rothbart. Philosophical Instruments: Minds and Tools
at Work. xiv + 138 pp. Urbana: University of Illinois, 2007. ∗
Isaac Record†
This slim volume contains much that is suggestive, but little that is
substantive. This is unfortunate, as there is need of a sustained analysis
of the epistemology of instruments.
The term “philosophical instruments” comes from Rothbart’s whiggish
read on seventeenth century mechanists, who distinguished between
the passive measurement devices they called “mathematical instruments”
and philosophical instruments, whose nature it is to disturb their target
and reveal the inner structure of the world. This conceit underscores
the distinction Rothbart finds lacking in traditional epistemology of
instruments: In answering the question of why scientists should
trust modern instruments to reliably expose unobservable structures,
philosophers claim that instruments function to extend our senses, but
many modern instruments are nothing like our senses.
Some modern instruments translate information away from direct
sensory perception; a photomultiplier readout charts milliamperes rather
than presenting the radiant energy in a directly accessible form.
The traditional justification for trusting observations made using such
instruments relies on reducing the operation of the instrument to two
older epistemic worries: sense organs that detect an instrument’s output
and a causal chain running from a specimen’s sensory properties to
the instrument’s output. (Humphreys’ 2003 Extending Ourselves is a
nice development of this line of reasoning.) But, Rothbart says, even
instruments like microscopes, which do seem to extend the limited
sensory capacity of unaided humans, should not be understood as mere
extensions. Doing so distorts the theoretical rationale behind modern
instruments; they expose a specimen’s underlying physical structure by
analogy to the technology of the instrument itself.
The reason we believe instruments to be reliable, according to
Rothbart, has little to do with thinking of them as similar to our
senses, but rather, thinking of them as similar to mechanisms we
already trust. Rothbart’s central thesis is that the design plans for
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instruments predispose scientists to see phenomena in a particular way by
invoking analogies to well-known causal processes. Whereas in traditional
instrument epistemology, our understanding of instruments necessarily
relies on our understanding of the naked senses, Rothbart wants to
understand instruments as extending what he calls “material possibility.”
In other words, instruments not only enhance our senses but also
enable skilful or sensitive manipulation of material. They are channels for
commitments about know-how, the knowledge of how to produce effects.
Rothbart’s alternative to traditional epistemology is to leave aside
analogies to senses and focus on the technological analogies. It turns
out, there is an easy way to find out what those technological analogies
are: all we have to do is look at the design plans of instruments. The
design process, Rothbart says, embeds epistemic maps into design
plans. Through their iconic syntax, such maps invoke analogies to trusted
mechanisms and thereby inform virtual witnessing–they invoke idealized
experimental ideas not reducible to materiality and physics. Unfortunately,
Rothbart’s focus on design plans seriously mischaracterizes the design
process. His emphasis on published plans removes focus from the
instrument itself. Using the design plans as an entrée to a wider discussion
of the design process could be useful, but stopping the analysis at
schematics is no better than stopping it at theory. Rothbart’s analysis
leaves no room for ‘cut and try’ engineering or for feedback in the design
process.
Philosophical Instruments begins well enough. Chapter 1 contains a
decent, if brief, historiography of the philosophy of instruments, with each
contributor receiving a few sentences. Rothbart convincingly argues that
there is more to be said, and he lays out his plan to say it. Unfortunately,
the rest of the book fails to bear out the promise of the beginning.
Chapters 2-4 deal with how plans reflect engineering knowledge. Rothbart
gives a lot of attention to iconographic thinking, which he says integrates
experience and hypothesis. That is, symbols in design diagrams carry
with them claims about reliability and function and these claims refer to
idealized rather than material versions of the components. These early
chapters contain more new work than the other chapters, which are
largely recapitulations of Rothbart’s earlier publications. Unfortunately,
there are some organizational problems. For example, Rothbart discusses
the “obvious” features of particular drawings before introducing the notion
of a suitably prepared interpreter–and without any discussion of how an
interpreter comes to be suitably prepared.
In the second half of the book, Chapters 5-7, Rothbart investigates
the ontological claims underpinning design plans, focusing on Hooke’s
microscope in Chapter 5 and the scanning tunneling electron microscope
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in Chapter 6. His treatment of Hooke’s microscope does well to
demonstrate why a new philosophical analysis of the epistemology of
instruments is necessary, but it lacks the historical rigor needed to rise
above a shallow re-reading of mechanist philosophy. Rothbart’s discussion
of the electron microscope is one of the most useful in the book,
although it serves more to illustrate than to demonstrate his themes. He
follows Hacking in side-stepping the age-old question about the reality
of unobservable entities by redefining “observable” as “experimentally
accessible,” making the distinction between unobservable (or “theoretical”)
entities and observable ones “dependent on detection methods available
to researchers at a particular time” (p. 82). Continuing with his
reconceptualization of instruments, “properties” become “capacities”
exercised by properly running apparatus. From them, then, we learn not
only about the world, but about the device with which we are intervening
in the world. Instrumental advance is a process of removing obstacles
and revealing the “concealed capacities” of instrument and specimen.
In short, a specimen is a signal-producing machine, and to properly
interpret its “message” requires a knowledge of causes, sources, noise,
and optimization. Rothbart argues that scientists accomplish this through
visualization of iconic modeling and thought experiments. “Noise” is
something not in the model of the specimen or detector, but which (cf.
Cartwright) we can nonetheless minimize and compensate for (p. 88). This
is in part because we assume that the world and instruments operate on
the same physical principles, making instruments “nomological machines.”
The book’s design leaves much to be desired. It concludes rather
abruptly with an afterword that reads like an afterthought. Rothbart’s
endnotes are few and therefore odd to have. He has included a short
glossary, a good bibliography, and a very short index. The book contains
twenty-nine line drawings to illustrate Rothbart’s thesis.
While I credit Rothbart with asking the right questions and recognizing
that instruments are performative and not simply constative, his answers
seem misguided. His most valuable insights come from a careful study
of the design process, not just design plans. Rothbart’s philosophy
is undeveloped and his historical claims unsupported. Rather than an
expansion and synthesis of earlier ideas, Philosophical Instruments is
largely a re-presentation of work published a decade earlier.
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